Before the Saadis (16th century), Morocco was dominated by non-Sharifian dynasties (Idrisids excepted, though they were often viewed as a localized holy house). The Wattasids, a Berber dynasty, failed not only militarily against the Portuguese and Spanish but also spiritually. They lacked the barakah to rally the fractious Amazigh (Berber) tribes and the powerful Sufi zawiyas (religious lodges).

Today, the Kingdom of Morocco remains the last true inheritor of this system. King Mohammed VI rules not only as a constitutional monarch but as Amir al-Mu'minin and a direct descendant of the Prophet. In an age of republics and nation-states, this survival testifies to the extraordinary resilience of the Sharifian idea: the belief that justice flows not from the ballot box or the cannon, but from the barakah of a lineage that once touched the hem of the Prophet’s cloak.

An Alaouite sultan’s power was measured not by how much land he controlled, but by how effectively he navigated the Siba . He would lead annual mouvements de cour (traveling courts) into the Atlas mountains, using a combination of barakah , marriage alliances, and military threat to bring recalcitrant tribes back into the fold.

Enter the Saadis. Claiming descent from the Prophet via Hasan, they leveraged the rising tide of maraboutism —the veneration of holy men and their lineages. In a landscape where no central army existed, a Sharifian claim was a unifying ideology. When Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Saadi declared jihad against the Portuguese in 1530, he did not just command men; he commanded a covenant. To follow a Sharif was to follow the barakah of the Prophet himself. The Sharifian Empire reached its apogee under Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur (r. 1578–1603). The pivotal moment was the Battle of Wadi al-Makhazin (also known as the Battle of the Three Kings) in 1578. The Portuguese king, Sebastian I, invaded Morocco with a crusading zeal. The resulting Portuguese defeat was total: three kings died (Sebastian of Portugal, the deposed Moroccan sultan Abu Abdallah, and the Wattasid pretender), and Ahmad al-Mansur emerged victorious.

More audaciously, al-Mansur attempted to pivot the Sharifian Empire from a regional power into a global one. He launched the Songhai Campaign (1590–1591), sending a small force of Andalusian musketeers and renegades across the Sahara. The capture of Timbuktu and Gao brought the salt and gold routes of the Sudan under Sharifian control. For a brief, glittering decade, Marrakesh became a hub of ghana (booty), scholarship, and trans-Saharan commerce.

Yet, this was an empire of extraction, not integration. The Saadis never built a bureaucracy to administer the Sudan; they relied on puppet askiyas . The barakah that won battles could not build a logistics network. The Sharifian model harbored a fatal flaw. If legitimacy derived from blood, then every male in the dynasty possessed a plausible claim to the throne. The Saadi succession was a nightmare of filicide, patricide, and palace coups. After al-Mansur’s death, his sons tore the empire apart, leading to the thirty-year Marrakesh-Fez civil war.