Icc Ftp ❲OFFICIAL❳

Between 2015 and 2022, the Netherlands, a consistent performer at World Cups, played just three ODI series against Full Members outside of ICC tournaments. The FTP contains no mandatory bilateral requirement for top-tier nations to host associates. Consequently, teams like Ireland and Afghanistan—elevated to Full Membership in 2017—have found themselves trapped in a scheduling limbo. They are Full Members on paper but are treated as associates in practice, forced to play most of their "home" series in neutral venues (Afghanistan in the UAE) or against each other. The FTP does not create a ladder; it reinforces a ceiling. The ICC has attempted to retrofit context onto the FTP, but each attempt has collapsed under the weight of commercial reality. The ODI Super League (2020-2023) was designed to guarantee 13 teams a minimum of 24 ODIs, providing a direct qualification path to the World Cup. It failed because the FTP could not enforce compliance. The England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) and Cricket Australia simply scheduled fewer ODIs, prioritizing T20 leagues. The league was scrapped after one cycle.

The commercial logic is undeniable: an India vs. West Indies T20I generates more broadcast revenue than a New Zealand vs. Sri Lanka Test series. However, the FTP’s sin is that it codifies this inequality. It actively encourages top boards to cancel or postpone tours to weaker nations in favor of repeat blockbuster series. The most infamous example came in 2021, when Cricket South Africa (CSA) sacrificed a Test series against Australia to launch a T20 league, only to see the FTP rejigged to ensure the lucrative "Boxing Day" Test remained at the Melbourne Cricket Ground. The programme does not serve cricket; it serves the balance sheets of three boards. Purists argue that the FTP should protect Test cricket, the format’s ultimate crucible. In reality, the current programme administers a slow, bureaucratic death to the red-ball game outside the elite. The introduction of the World Test Championship (WTC) in 2019 was meant to inject context, but the FTP undermined it from the start. Because the FTP allows bilateral flexibility, the WTC is not a balanced league but a patchwork quilt of series of varying lengths—some two Tests, some five. A team can win the championship by defeating weaker opponents in short series while avoiding grueling five-match tours.

Finally, the ICC must mandate that each Full Member play at least one bilateral series (minimum two ODIs or one Test) per year against an associate nation, with the associate retaining 75% of the broadcast revenue. This is not charity; it is investment in the sport’s long-term health. The ICC Future Tours Programme is a paradox: a document born from a desire for order that has become a tool of oligarchy. It has successfully eliminated the chaos of the 1990s, only to replace it with the sterility of a closed shop. By enshrining the commercial dominance of the Big Three, devaluing Test cricket through scheduling fragmentation, and excluding associates from meaningful competition, the FTP has turned international cricket from a global sport into a luxury brand for three nations. Until the schedule serves sporting merit rather than television rights, the future of the "Future Tours Programme" will remain one of managed decline—a spreadsheet perfectly calibrated to protect the powerful, while the game withers at the edges. icc ftp

Second, a promotion-relegation system for Test cricket must be embedded into the FTP. The bottom two Full Members should play a play-off series against the top two associates every two years, with the winners earning a two-year slot in a streamlined, mandatory Test calendar. This would inject jeopardy and opportunity.

The International Cricket Council’s (ICC) Future Tours Programme (FTP) is ostensibly a benign scheduling framework—a five-year master calendar designed to provide clarity, context, and continuity to the fragmented ecosystem of international cricket. Yet, beneath its spreadsheet of dates and venues lies a powerful, deeply political instrument. Far from being a neutral arbiter of sporting logistics, the FTP is the primary architect of modern cricket’s structural inequities. It systematically privileges commercial viability over competitive balance, entrenches a cartel of wealthy “Big Three” nations (India, England, Australia), and accelerates the existential crisis facing Test cricket while simultaneously starving associate nations of meaningful opportunity. The Genesis of Order from Chaos To understand the FTP’s current dysfunction, one must appreciate its original intent. Before its introduction in 2002, international cricket was a chaotic free-for-all. Bilateral series were negotiated ad hoc, often driven by post-colonial ties or the whims of charismatic board presidents. Smaller nations like Sri Lanka and New Zealand frequently found themselves unable to secure lucrative tours, while wealthier boards cherry-picked opponents. The FTP was a noble attempt to impose rationality: a binding schedule where every Full Member would play every other over a four-year cycle, guaranteeing revenue, exposure, and a semblance of a world championship. Between 2015 and 2022, the Netherlands, a consistent

Similarly, the WTC’s points system is so convoluted (equal points for a two-Test series as a five-Test series) that it distorts strategy. Teams deliberately schedule short series against lower-ranked opponents to maximize points per match. The FTP thus incentivizes cowardice over ambition. Why play a five-Test series in India when you can play two and preserve your ranking? To salvage the FTP, the ICC must abandon its role as a passive scheduler and embrace that of an active regulator. Three reforms are necessary. First, the programme must become a binding contract, not a guideline. Any board that cancels a bilateral series without extraordinary cause should face severe financial penalties and the loss of voting rights.

For a brief period, it worked. However, the programme’s fatal flaw was its lack of enforceable consequence and its reliance on the goodwill of autonomous boards. When the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) realized its market dominance—generating over 70% of global cricket revenue—the FTP ceased to be a contract and became a suggestion. The most glaring indictment of the FTP is its open bias toward the so-called "Big Three." In the 2014-2023 cycle, India played 61 Test matches; Bangladesh, a Full Member with a passionate fanbase, played just 41. More tellingly, of the 173 bilateral series scheduled between 2018 and 2023, nearly 40% involved India, England, or Australia. This is not scheduling; it is hoarding. They are Full Members on paper but are

Furthermore, the FTP’s relentless expansion of the T20 window—driven by the proliferation of franchise leagues (IPL, BBL, The Hundred, SA20)—has cannibalized the Test calendar. In the 2023-2027 cycle, the ICC has allocated 44% of the calendar to T20 cricket, up from 32% a decade ago. For nations like the West Indies and Sri Lanka, the FTP effectively forces their best players to choose between lucrative league contracts (which fall in the FTP’s "windows") and representing their country in Tests. The result is a two-tier system: a vibrant, moneyed T20 circus and a decaying, under-attended Test arena for all but three nations. If the FTP is harsh on Full Members outside the elite, it is genocidal toward associate nations. The programme’s structure is one of "trickle-down" scheduling—the false hope that if Nepal, the UAE, or Scotland perform well in ICC tournaments, they will earn bilateral fixtures against Full Members. This rarely happens.